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Abstract:  
We analyse a part of Vincent’s theory that has been neglected by the English School 
discourse: his idea of the right to subsistence, particularly the right to food, as the basis 
on which to build a cross-cultural human rights project across the societies of the world. 
Vincent insisted that starvation is the ‘resident emergency’ of international society and 
its elimination should be the minimum standard for the society of states to achieve 
legitimacy.  We assess here the normative and practical viability of that enterprise as a 
project of solidarism in international society. Such assessment reveals that Vincent’s 
work has made three contributions to English school thinking. In relation to the 
solidarist agenda, Vincent  both widened the human rights agenda, and pushed the idea 
of developing a normative consensus around the basic right to food. More generally, his 
work forces the English school to think seriously about the relationship between 




This article is built on Vincent’s basic rights initiative, which has two dimensions: 
the right to security (meaning freedom from oppression) and the right to subsistence 
(meaning freedom from starvation). The first dimension reflected the concerns of his 
predecessors, especially Bull, and inspired a section of the English school that works on 
  1the humanitarian intervention dilemma. This Vincentian branch is mainly represented by 
Dunne, Knudsen and Wheeler. The second one enters into the realm of international 
political economy by seeking to build a consensus in international society around a basic 
human right to be free from starvation. This idea aims at avoiding the ideological 
controversies of humanitarian intervention on individual security grounds. However, this 
dimension of his basic rights programme has not been developed either by him or by the 
authors who work in his tradition. The relevance of a right to subsistence has been 
pointed out by Dunne and Wheeler but the empirical side of Vincent’s project remains 
unexplored.
1 Since Vincent defined the right to food as the foundation of his basic rights 
project, this gap is a problem.  
By concentrating on this neglected aspect of Vincent’s basic rights project, we 
will argue here that he has made a significant contribution to solidarism as a viable 
project in the society of states. First, we will track the development of Vincent’s basic 
rights thinking, with particular emphasis on the right to subsistence, and its place in the 
English school. In the next section, we will document the normative and practical 
dimensions of the right to food and assess them in relation to Vincent’s project. In the 
final section, we will consider the implications of the empirical reality for the viability 
of Vincent’s solidarist project. We focus on three contributions by Vincent that have 
neither been adequately appreciated by those who have commented on him, nor 
followed up within the English school tradition.
2 For solidarists, Vincent both widened 
the human rights agenda, and pushed the idea of developing a normative consensus 
around the basic right to food. More generally, his work links thinking about 
international society to the agenda of International Political Economy.   
 
2. Vincent and his basic rights approach to a viable project of solidarism 
 
In this section we document the development of Vincent’s basic rights thinking, 
with particular reference to the right to subsistence,and then locate this argument in the 
wider framework of the English school. The whole of this section will provide a 
theoretical analysis of the implied, but never carried out, project of the right to 
subsistence in Vincent’s solidarist understanding of the society of states.  
Vincent worked within the English school tradition of International Relations, 
where he explored the possibilities for the practical realisation of a human rights agenda 
in the society of states. He developed his body of thought in the pluralist/solidarist 
framework set out by his predecessor Hedley Bull. The solidarist current of thought has 
traditionally opposed the pluralist by asking for, or pointing to, a higher degree of shared 
values than the mere pursuit of coexistence and preservation of difference, yet while 
maintaining the principle of sovereignty as the basis for the society of states. Vincent 
was searching for a way out of the pluralist frame set by Bull, particularly in seeking a 
way around Bull’s concern that the cultivation of human rights law would almost 
inevitably be subversive of the key principles of international society (sovereignty and 
nonintervention) and therefore subversive of world order.
3 Solidarism has usually been 
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understanding. At the heart of his discussion, he introduced a basic rights project that 
tried to establish ‘a common floor under the societies of the world’ by creating a ‘global 
cosmopolitan culture’ that would offer consensus on essential values.
4 His proposal was 
an attempt to bridge the pluralist demands of international society (sovereignty and non-
intervention) with the humankind that joins individuals across frontiers. 
 
a)  The place of basic rights within Vincent’s theory 
 
  Basic rights constitute a distinctive element in Vincent’s work and it is impossible 
to describe his conception of international society without reference to them. Vincents’s 
idea is the development of a more solidarist international society, in which states 
become more alike internally, and therefore more likely to find common ground in 
agreeing about when the right of humanitarian intervention overrides the principle of 
nonintervention.
5
  Vincent committed himself to the intellectual discourse of international society 
and accepted the principle of states being the main containers of collective identity. His 
interpretation of this  has two phases: the early Vincent showed a pluralist direction 
under the influence of his mentor Bull and accepted a thin international society where 
states cohabit through their insistence on their separateness. The late Vincent, however, 
projected the need to bring morality into the schemes of international society and the 
way to do it was by states becoming more alike internally and, therefore, more prone to 
find a common ground.
6 At this stage, international society would not just be about the 
‘separateness’ of states. The growing concern for human rights called Vincent to 
consider other shared values inside sovereignty. Still committed to the idea of states as 
the containers of collective identity, he hinted at a new approach to the principles of 
international society: ‘There lies a countertheme of human rights consolidating the state 
rather than transcending it… we might extent a cautious welcome to both the penetration 
of the state and to its strengthening itself in response’.
7  
In both early and late Vincent the basic idea is the same: state’s sovereignty and 
mutual acknowledgement of autonomy. The understanding of it, however, has changed. 
It is now the opening of the state within a thicker international society that strengthens 
sovereignty, and not the insistence on separateness. Vincent became an advocate of 
solidarism by calling for a cross-cultural consensus on basic rights to strengthen 
sovereignty, rather than insisting on separateness. This line of thinking is Vincent’s key 
to resolving the tensions between pluralism and solidarism.
8
Although Vincent does not discuss the solidarist/pluralist debate directly, his work 
offers an interpretation of solidarist international society locked into his discussion of 
human rights and, particularly, into his basic rights project. This is a specific 
understanding of solidarism. In the Vincentian sense, human rights capture the moral 
duties of international society. Consequently, solidarism asserts an obligation towards 
the protection of individuals beyond the political frontiers into which they are 
  3organised.
9 However, Vincent does admit that only the state has normative capacity for 
implementing moral claims. Together with their moral responsibility in international 
society, states also sustain and shape the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. 
He refers to the possibility of basic rights being not a challenge to the society of 
sovereign states, but something that could add to its legitimacy on the basis of the 
common floor established by cosmopolitan consensus through an exchange among 
cultures.
10  In this context, Vincent notes that ‘the spread of a global culture makes 
international society work more smoothly’, and takes hope in the historical record by 
which the state has made deals with civil society ‘coopting the ideology of individualism 
by translating human rights into citizens rights’.
11 With this line of thinking, Vincent 
begins to blend together a state-based, solidarist international society, with an 
underlying world society of common culture. 
Basic rights is about placing a common ground under the cultures of the world as 
the lowest common denominator among humankind. Drawing from the work of Henry 
Shue,
12 Vincent selects the right to security and the right to subsistence as those that 
belong to that common floor underpinning the cultures of the world. This does not mean 
that other rights are less valuable, but that the enjoyment of other rights cannot take 
place if these rights are not met. His project on basic rights, where he prioritises the right 
to subsistence, is connected to his idea that ‘for international society to become better 
founded, there must be a minimum standard of human rights observance’.
13 He selects 
the right to subsistence as the ‘basis of basic rights’ and insists starvation is the resident 
emergency of international society, meaning hunger as a routine phenomenon in the 
system. Given the size of this enterprise, Vincent compares its eradication with the 
elimination of the slave trade. By concentrating on the right to subsistence as the 
ultimate foundation of basic rights, Vincent tried to escape the ideological controversies 
of the rest of the human rights discourse. The right to subsistence allows both ‘unity and 
diversity’, as it is not reducible to any particular culture, and should be common to all 
understandings of civilisation.
14
  Vincent’s theory on basic rights, anchored in his universalist understanding of 
human rights generally, tried to explain if it is possible at a very basic level to talk about 
a global understanding (common floor) across the cultures of the world in order to avoid 
ideological obstacles and build an agenda for the practical realisation of human rights in 
international society. That way, Vincent drove attention away from humanitarian 
intervention, normally orientated towards crises created either by the breakdown of the 
state or by repressive and discriminatory state behaviour, and focused on the ‘routine 
practices’ of international society that have repercussions in the number of deaths by 
starvation. This move is the key to understanding the differentiation of Vincent’s basic 
rights approach from the human rights concerns that dominate the solidarist debate 
within the English school. In common with the other solidarists, Vincent saw the rights 
of states as deriving from their being manifestations of the right of self-determination of 
peoples. This right, in his view required that states have some minimum degree of civil 
relationship with their citizens. If a state was ‘utterly delinquent in this regard (by laying 
  4waste its own citizens, or by bringing on secessionist movements)’, and ‘by its conduct 
outrages the conscience of mankind’, then its entitlement to the protection of the 
principle of non-intervention should be suspended. He qualified such suspensions by 
saying that the circumstances triggering a right of humanitarian intervention must be 
extraordinary ones, not routine.
15 This way of thinking, with its focus mainly on the 
relationship between state and citizen, and on exceptional and extreme cases, is in line 
with solidarist orthodoxy. Vincent’s basic rights approach offers a quite different path 
into human rights; while searching for a constructive engagement between governments, 
his perspective is not triggered so much by the relationship between states and their own 
citizens, but by the relationship of people to the global economy. It is not focused on the 
exceptional and extreme cases but on the routine practices. It is consequently not about 
the right of intervention but about the responsibility of international society, and 
particularly the great powers, to manage the global economy in a humane fashion.  
  Vincent’s proposal is not about overthrowing the current system but about 
introducing into it a project of basic rights that adds to its legitimacy by correcting its 
current mistakes. Vincent looks at what international society can do about hunger along 
the lines of short-term measures (aid) and permanent structural reforms (trade). Vincent 
did not discuss the very complicated and multifaceted question of what could and should 
be done in practical terms about hunger. Instead, he focused on the international 
responsibility for the problem regardless of cause, and looked specifically at what 
international society could do about it without infringing on sovereignty. He suggested 
the possibility of having to restructure the international economic order to meet the right 
to subsistence of the ‘submerged 40%’ but did not pursue the practical implications of 
his statements. 
   
b)  Vincent’s basic rights project in the English school 
 
  The relevance of the subsistence dimension of Vincent’s basic rights program was 
not tested by Vincent or by the Vincentian branch of the English school. Therefore, its 
potential contribution to solidarism has been bypassed in the English school account, 
although acknowledged by Dunne and Wheeler. They have manifested their concern 
with the problem of starvation, which they call the ‘silent genocide’.
16
  In his account of Vincent, Dunne closes the chapter with a remark along the lines 
of the argument discussed earlier: ‘For a solidarist model to be realised in practice… it 
means addressing the plight of the global poor, which Vincent regarded as the twentieth 
century’s equivalent of the slave trade’. Dunne hints here at Vincent’s major 
contribution but misses the achievements that the normative grounds of the right to 
subsistence have already provided for the solidarist project. He concludes with a major 
policy assumption not strictly in line with Vincent’s project: ‘Liberating the world from 
this Holocaust of neglect requires promoting welfare internationalism’. This statement 
opens a series of implications that Dunne did not explain. In this regard, Dunne’s 
contribution has been to highlight how solidarism ‘is about more than deciding on a 
  5particular criterion for suspending the norm of non-intervention’.
17 However, he does 
not investigate this matter further and works instead along the lines of humanitarian 
intervention on individual security grounds.  
  Wheeler provides insightful remarks about the ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
dilemmas linked to starvation, as will be quoted later. He calls for attention to the 
routine deaths by hunger within the system and highlights the need for commitment in 
liberal societies to overcome the phenomena of poverty and malnutrition. 
18 However, he 
does not work further on those points, and diverts his focus into the extraordinary cases 
of hunger.  He concentrates specifically on the famine that gripped Somalia in 1992 as a 
consequence of the collapse of the Somali state into civil strife. 
19
  Another example of the literature’s neglect of Vincent’s contribution to the 
solidarist dilemma through his approach to subsistence can be found in Neumann’s 
work. He concludes that Vincent’s ‘preliminary’ investigation is ‘inconclusive’ about 
whether a common culture exists.
20 Although it is certainly the case that Vincent does 
not provide conclusive remarks about the empirical dimension of his project, Neumann’s 
evaluation too easily dismisses the relevance of Vincent’s basic rights project, especially 
with regard to the normative viability of his approach to subsistence, as we will review 
in the next section.  
In order to analyse how viable this is as a project for a solidarist international 
society, another key point in Vincent’s solidarism must be highlighted: his defense of 
the existence of a relationship between theory and practice. This applies to both 
academic theorising and political practice and to the normative and practical realms of 
international relations. On academic-political grounds, Vincent insisted that academics 
should remain independent from political advocacy but not separated. Theory, in his 
opinion, is a guide to policy with the duty to clarify and confront fundamental questions 
that practitioners may take for granted.
21 In his own words, ‘theory cannot be an 
intellectual exercise divorced from the requirement ultimately to deliver a position on 
policy’.
22 At the same time, he observed state practice in order to develop his innovative 
project on the right to subsistence.  
  This attitude connects with his view on solidarism, which has a normative side 
that describes how states ought to behave and a practical one that looks at how they 
actually behave: ‘the central distinction becomes that between theory (policy) and 
practice (experience), a distinction akin to that between values and facts’.
23 This 
normative-practical interaction is fundamental when analysing the room for basic rights 
in international society, which varies on the basis of Vincent’s understanding of the 
theory: a division between what is the current practical situation of the basic right to 
subsistence, what are its connections with the theory, and what does a normative 
explanation of basic rights offer to the future of practice in the context of international 
society?  
  When applied to the right to food, the normative dimension occupies the territory 
of positive law, where international agreements, even if at the level of soft law, have 
given a rights framework to the access to food. The practical dimension refers to the 
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next section.  
 
3. The right to food in global practice: normative commitment and practical 
default 
 
Although Vincent was not able to elaborate his project on the right to subsistence 
before he died, two clues define the direction of his thinking. First, the drive in his basic 
rights project to respect and even strengthen sovereignty means that he did not intend to 
overthrow the current system, but to ‘add to its legitimacy’ by pursuing a solidarist 
project that allows for a greater degree of economic equality. Second, when referring to 
what international society could do about the problem of hunger, he led his argument 
towards permanent structural reforms of the global economy that would benefit the 
‘submerged 40%’. International trade is the arena where his basic right to subsistence 
can be tested on these two fronts. The connection between international trade and hunger 
(via poverty) has been made explicit by several international soft-law agreements on the 
subject. Governments have agreed at different summits that the eradication of poverty is 
essential to improve access to food and emphasised that trade is a key element in 
achieving food security.  
  
a)  The normative-practical picture 
 
  The diplomatic landmarks in the normative evolution of the right to food within 
international society, and its connection there with the global structure of poverty and 
trade are as follows:  
-  The Universal Human Rights Declaration in 1948 set the international context for the 
right to food to become a global entitlement: ‘Everyone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including 
food’ (article 25).  
-  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966: Article 
11 deals comprehensively with ‘the fundamental right of everyone to be free from 
hunger’. It has been ratified by 142 states.   
- The  Universal  Declaration  on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition of 1974 
was the first specific international treaty on the right to food. Its main statement 
pointed to the clear role of states: ‘It is a fundamental responsibility of governments 
to work together for higher production and a more equitable and efficient distribution 
of food between countries and within countries’ (para. 2).  
-  The Convention of the Rights of the Child in 1989 insists that ‘States parties must 
take appropriate measures to combat disease and malnutrition, including through the 
provision of nutritious food and drinking water’. It has been ratified by 191 states.  
-  The World Food Summit in 1996, held in Rome, and attended by 185 Heads of State 
or deputies as well as numerous IGOs and civil society organisations, created what is 
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specific pledge to reduce by half the number of hungry people (800 million at the 
time) by 2015. State parties signed a plan of action with 7 commitments related to 
food security, including a ‘fair world trade system’.  
-  Following on from this summit, a series of consultations defined in greater detail the 
right to food. The highest legal interpretation was achieved in 1999 with 
Commitment 12 adopted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR). It is an authoritative interpretation of the right to food prescribed by the 
CESCR in its role of monitoring the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. As a consequence, a Special Rapporteur has 
been appointed to follow the progress on protecting the right to food. Further work is 
being done on the development of the legal mechanism in order to strengthen the 
bindingness of the final documents of the World Food Summit. Recent consultations 
carried out with that purpose have focused on the link between poverty and hunger, 
and called for the eradication of poverty to eliminate hunger, with international trade 
being a key tool in the proccess.    
  These developments brought into the rights framework an understanding of the 
role of the state and other actors in the measures needed to reduce hunger, and made 
explicit the link to international trade. They also elaborated a definition of the right to 
food itself, including a minimum measurement of the calories needed, which provides a 
clear reference on what hunger is and what is physically needed to overcome it.  Even if 
the criteria for what constitutes adequate food are subject to cultural variations, the 
number of calories required for a healthy life is not, which eliminates a great deal of the 
relativism that underpins controversies about other human rights. The essential point 
about these developments is that the right itself has obtained a broad cross-cultural 
consensus across the society of states. Unlike with other aspects of the human rights 
agenda, Vincent’s aspiration to create a minimum world common culture around the 
right to subsistence appears already to have been achieved. Controversy remains around 
the difficult economic, social and political questions involved in its implementation, but 
the right itself is not contested. As the participants in the Rome Declaration said: ‘We 
consider it intolerable that more than 800 million throughout the world and particularly 
in developing countries do not have enough food to meet their basic nutritional needs. 
This situation is unacceptable’.
24 The problem is that the normative consensus, at the 
level of international soft-law, defines the obligations of states but does not specify the 
policy measures.   
The plan to reduce by half the number of hungry people was renewed at several 
international summits, such as the Millennium Declaration (2000) and the Johannesburg 
Summit (2002). An in-detail review of the 2015 deadline came in June 2002 with 
another World Food Summit where states reported their achievements towards the goal. 
A major point here was the acknowledgement of the great progress made in the 
normative sphere, while disappointment was expressed at the slow progress registered in 
the practical realm. New statistics published by the FAO in October 2002, revealed that 
  8this problem of too-slow practical progress was much worse that thought. The FAO now 
said that instead of a reduction of 6 million people per year during the 1990s, the true 
figure had been only 2.5 million. These new figures show that if changes are not applied 
to the current policy structure, then the aim of halving the number of undernourished 
will not be achieved for over a century. In order to reach the 2015 goal, reduction in the 
number of hungry people would have to be accelerated to 24 million a year, almost 10 
times the current pace.
25   
Since the pace of reduction is now too slow to meet the existing commitments, 
hunger is now a much more pressing problem. If the normative commitment against 
hunger is to retain any credibility, the new figures require heavy reformulations at the 
level of policy-making and action. Unless the significant commitments in the normative 
realm (signed by states across the international spectrum), can be coupled with higher 
levels of practical action to reduce the number of hungry people, the normative 
commitment will be exposed as hollow. Out of the 800 million hungry people that the 
world has right now, only 67 million are a consequence of man-made or natural 
disasters. The rest are due to routine economic-socio-political failures, which indicates 
that the need to tackle structural problems is now pressing.
26 The choice is between 
accepting the collapse of the normative commitment to make substantial reductions in 
the number of hungry people, and undertaking the sorts of economic reforms that will 
achieve such reductions. In terms of Vincent’s project, the question is whether 
international society will abandon its commitment to a basic right of subsistence, or find 
ways of improving its performance in reducing the number of hungry. The FAO’s new 
statistics strip away the comfortable position of the 1990s in which existing policies 
seemed to be producing substantial reductions in the number of hungry even if not fast 
enough. Now the question is posed in much starker terms: abandon the normative 
position or change the economic structure. The scope for action for international society 
to address this problem lies in the linkage between hunger and the international 
economic system, and therefore in reforms to that system.  
Two alternatives to the existing global economic structure are currently under 
heated debate: one radical, the other more moderate. The radical one asks for eradication 
of the WTO-based system and the creation of a new economic order that avoids the 
anomalies of the present system. This option encompasses several proposals along the 
lines of the anti-globalisation movements. Their common denominator is their rejection 
of the liberal economic structure, and claim that the exclusion of millions of people from 
access to food is ‘a consequence of economic, agricultural and trade policies that have 
been imposed by the developed countries’.
27 However they assume that globalisation is 
reversible without adequately considering the consequences of such a policy, and they 
do not offer a firm alternative that has proved to be successful in practice. Much of their 
emphasis is on local self-reliance, which does not constitute an adequate response to the 
problem of how to feed a world heading for a population of 9 billion people.
28  
  The more moderate option is to keep the existing economic system while 
introducing substantial reforms in it that will address the problem of hunger by 
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29 This 
includes a review of the international trade mechanism that starts inside the richest core 
of the system (tariffs, development box…) and external measures such as an increase in 
aid, which has seen a sustained decrease from the 1990s. Official aid to agriculture in 
developing countries went down from US$14 billion in 1988 to US$ 8 billion as of 
1999.
30  This view is backed up by FAO research affirming that the world produces 
enough food to feed 12 billion people, but fails to feed its current 6 billion due to 
distribution and accessibility problems.
31 It can be argued that this approach does not 
involve only costs for the rich, but that there are economic benefits for the richer 
countries to cut down their protectionist measures.
32 Such a policy would translate into 
savings in the subsidies to agriculture that come from the taxpayer and in cheaper food 
for the consumers of wealthy countries. The actual solution could thus be in terms of 
negotiations that in the long term would favour both parties, although Vincent was more 
radical and simply asked for action from those who have the power to do something 
about hunger. The possibility of mutual gain should, however, ease the politics of such a 
reform. This option is in line with Vincent’s thinking, which did not ask for the 
destruction of the existing system but the correction of its anomalies in order to 
introduce his project of basic rights. 
 
b)  Obstacles to the implementation of the right to food 
 
  The empirical examination of Vincent’s project has proved that the basic right to 
subsistence is already a fact in positive law (on international soft law grounds), since the 
agreement on the value of the basic right to food is universal and has been signed by 
states across the spectrum. Therefore, normatively and as a philosophic-political 
construction it is well established in positive law with unanimous agreement, which 
already gives the concept an advantage with respect to the rest of the human rights 
discourse. As previously noted, there is even a general agreement, in terms of 
international law, about what constitutes the right to be free from hunger with a specific 
measure about calorie levels. This normative viability shows that Vincent’s proposal to 
build a common floor under the societies of the world through an inter-cultural dialogue 
was perfectly realistic and achievable. It also underlines the importance of the global 
economy as a domain within which to pursue the solidarist project.  
  ‘Normative viability’ means here the fact that states from opposite corners of the 
world have come together on the grounds of positive law, and regardless of their 
cultural, political or social background signed international agreements that recognise 
the right to food. However, on practical grounds the scenario changes. According to 
Vincent’s approach, taking the right to food as the minimum cross-cultural floor should 
avoid the controversies linked to most other aspects of the human rights agenda. While 
this seems true in the normative domain, it is much less so in the practical one. Even if 
Vincent’s attention to the international economic structure in relation to hunger avoids 
the divisions over ideological relativism that plague humanitarian intervention on 
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economic reforms necessary to implement the right to subsistence. This creates a 
problem not anticipated by Vincent: a disjuncture between normative consensus and 
practical implementation. The standard problem in the humanitarian intervention debate 
is why should a set of countries embrace policies in order to benefit other countries? 
Why should citizens of one country help citizens in another? The normative consensus 
on the right to food would seem to dispose of these problems and thus in principle open 
a smooth path to practical solutions. Wheeler appears to follow Vincent’s expectations: 
‘feelings of sympathy for the suffering of others… might mean a willingness to bear the 
costs of a long-term strategy of forcible humanitarian intervention, but it most certainly 
requires liberal societies to take practical steps that would reduce the number of slow 
deaths through poverty and malnutrition’.
33 In practice, however, as seen in the previous 
subsection, the mechanics of implementation inevitably engage with wider ideological 
disputes about how the international economy should be organised and managed. For 
example, the commitments of the 1996 Declaration say things such as ‘creating a stable 
political environment’ where food security is respected as well as ‘respect of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’.
34 These features are subject to a heated debate and 
are not as straight-forward or neutral as the commitment makes them sound. Because of 
this, normative consensus on the right to food does not lead to consensus on what 
practical policies to pursue. So long as the existing practices of the liberal international 
economic order seemed to be delivering substantial reductions in hunger, as appeared to 
be the case during the 1990s, this disjuncture could be ignored. But on the new FAO 
statistics it comes into sharp focus. The elimination of routine hunger within a 
reasonable timescale cannot be achieved without reforms to the global economy 
substantial enough to raise ideological discords located more in the debates about 
international political economy than human rights. 
  The answers to the question about why citizens of one country should take 
responsibility for the welfare of those in another can take different forms depending on 
the level at which the practical solution is sought: the individual (cosmopolitan 
solidarity), the state (sovereignty interpreted as self-responsibility for government and 
welfare), and the transnational (corporate and NGO rights and responsibilities). The 
parameters within which Vincent worked involved a society of states respecting each 
other’s sovereignty, and that meant that the prime ground for implementation had to be 
in the international trade and financial structure, embodied in the global institutional 
framework of the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. The legitimacy of this framework 
requires that all partners  share in the joint gains, and therefore the conspicuous benefit 
of a group of them at the expense of others is a tension within the current system. The 
structure of the liberal international economic order is itself an expression of solidarism 
in that states agree to treat the market as an institution of international society. This 
normative agreement is backed up by practical measures both to ensure the efficient 
operation of the market on a global scale, and to guard against the instabilities and 
inequities that such a market generates.
35 In contrast to the soft-law status of the right to 
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organisational forms. 
  At this point a crucial irony becomes apparent. One of the key suppositions of all 
but the anti-globalisation positions is that opening up agricultural trade would produce 
major benefits in reducing both poverty and hunger in the poorer quarters of 
international society. Such opening is wholly in line with the general principles of a 
liberal international economic order, which means that there should be no ideological 
blockage between the right to food and the operation of a liberal world economy. 
Whether Vincent would have accepted the opening of agricultural trade as a means of 
implementing his project is a moot point, but the present practical reality is that the main 
industrial players in rich world (the US, the EU, Japan) all pursue highly protectionist 
policies towards their own agricultural sectors. They do this mainly for domestic social 
and political reasons, but the effect is to block the main path to the practical realisation 
of the normative consensus about the elimination of hunger. The blockage is an anomaly 
within the WTO framework, not between it and international society’s goal of realising 
the basic right to subsistence. Proposals to reduce rich world agricultural subsidies 
encounter strong obstacles, the most recent being: the failure to drive the agricultural 
trade negotiations forward at the Johannesburg summit; the recent discord about 
Fishler’s attempt to reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the European 
Union, which were strongly opposed by countries such as France; and the new USA 
farm bill, which will increase governmental agricultural support by 82 billion dollars 
over the next 10 years.
36  
  This context sets Vincent’s crucial conclusion into clear perspective: ‘in regard to 
the failure to provide subsistence rights, it is not this or that government whose 
legitimacy is in question but the whole international economic system in which we are 
all implicated’.
37 This is Vincent’s major statement linked to his claims about 
introducing reforms to the economic system. The reforms in the system are not just an 
option for helping out other countries, but an element that determines the legitimacy of 
the system itself. Without reform of the international structural elements that sustain 
hunger, the legitimacy of international society itself will erode. In the world after 




  The previous discussion shows how crucial the distinction between the normative 
and the practical is for understanding Vincent’s work, and therefore, for drawing our 
final conclusions in relation to the viability of his solidarist project. On the normative 
front, the right to food has undergone a thorough review in the last few years and 
reached a level of consensus across international society not seen in relation to any other 
human right. On the practical front, although progress has been achieved, international 
society faces a tougher test than ever after the latest statistics on hunger and the gap they 
show in relation to the normative commitments. The choice is radical: international 
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practices. The first option has heavy moral implications, considering that it costs an 
average of 24,000 deaths per day. The second option requires as the key first step a 
significant and difficult change of political priorities within the main industrial powers 
in their policies on agricultural production and trade. As argued above, there is no 
conflict of principle between the WTO regime and the liberalisation of agricultural 
trade, but the blockage created by US, EU and Japanese agricultural protectionism 
nonetheless represents a major practical obstacle to the most obvious course of action 
open to international society to address the problem of hunger (the reform scenario 
described above). Despite some positive developments, Vincent’s attempt to simplify 
the practical realisation of a human rights agenda through the right to food has thus 
proved to be more complicated in practice that his statements indicated. How 
international society reacts in relation to the 2015 goal will test the full viability of his 
ideas. The case of hunger does, however, support Vincent’s idea that a more solidarist 
approach to human rights need not be incompatible with the principle of sovereignty that 
underpins international society. Vincent was cautious about this, writing his theoretical 
statements about the possibility of basic rights strengthening sovereignty in a hesitant 
tone: ‘the state may be strengthened…’ or  ‘we might extend a cautious welcome to both 
the penetration of the state’(our emphasis).
38 Yet the developments in international law 
regarding the right to food that followed in the 1990s corroborate how the achievements 
in this area are compatible with the principle of sovereignty. 
  We have argued that Vincent’s key contribution to the human rights debate within 
the English school context was the idea that one should start bottom-up by finding the 
lowest common denominator normative commitment that could be agreed across 
cultures and using that as the foundation for building practical measures. The 
proposition is that starting with issues on which normative consensus can be, or has 
been, obtained is already a step in favour of a solidarist project of international society, 
and will bear more practical fruit than starting with issues where there is no such 
consensus, and not much prospect of building it. That said, Vincent also thought that 
those in a position to do something about the problem of hunger had a special obligation 
to do so. This analysis fits the present situation perfectly. The global normative 
consensus is in place, and those in a position to act are the wealthy group of industrial 
powers. The normative pressures on this group come not only from the moral obligation 
to do something about the problem of hunger, but also from the logic of the global 
trading regime that they should extend to agriculture the liberalising rules they demand 
for most other products and services. The present situation can thus be seen as a crucial 
test for Vincent’s idea that a bottom-up, basic rights approach is the best way to develop 
a global human rights regime. If the normative consensus cannot produce action here, 
where it has both the hunger issue and the general principles of trade liberalisation in its 
favour, then it might be reasonable to conclude that it does not have the political 
potential that Vincent expected. In that case, Jackson’s view that normative consensus is 
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order, would seem to be the more accurate interpretation.
39
  Considering that solidarism in relation to human rights has a prescriptive 
dimension on the level of what ‘ought to be’ and not just what ‘it is’, the remarkable 
consensus achieved recently on the right to food is already proof of the viability of one 
dimension of solidarism. It shows how solidarism is upheld in the normative sphere of 
international society, where the right to food as the highest expression of such viability 
developed during the 1990s. In the longer term, however, this will need to be coupled 
with a firmer practical application in order to keep its current value and avoid falling 
into empty rhetoric.   
  Therefore, the central issue in reaching some overall judgment on Vincent’s idea 
is the timescale over which it should be expected to operate. It is pretty easy to see that 
the practical application of Vincent’s basic rights project requires higher levels of 
legalisation at the normative level together with a series of reforms implemented in the 
international economic structure in combination with changes at the national level. 
Several proposals (including the international summits signed by the governments) show 
how this could be achieved within the parameters of the current system, and continuing 
with existing policy can no longer be taken as an adequate response: ‘A fair trading 
system, coherent international and national policies and targeted investment are all 
required if the world is to feed all its people. Trade reform that furthers this goal is both 
possible and of the utmost priority’.
40 But while the goal and the means are clear, the 
timescale is not. If no immediate action is taken that accelerates the reduction in the 
number of the world’s hungry should that be taken as reason to reject Vincent’s 
approach? What kind of process is it reasonable to expect when looking at the influence 
of normative consensus on practical action? 
  Perhaps the first fact to observe is that international efforts to eliminate hunger 
have been intensified in the last ten years, and this shows a rejection of leaving the 
numbers as they are.  Efforts to narrow the gap between theory and practice through 
diverse proposals have taken place over the last decade and steps of progress on the 
practical solidarist side are illustrated by the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(AGOA, in the United States) and the Everything But Arms agreement (EBA, in the 
European Union). These agreements offer incentives to the poorest developing countries 
to build their international market economy. The incentives include very low tariffs or 
no tariffs at all in selected products to enter the European and American markets 
respectively.  
  Even more important for Vincent’s argument is the observable dynamic of 
international society where a solidarist normative consensus is initially coupled with a 
pluralist practice, but later followed slowly by more solidarist actions. There are 
examples in international law that show this evolution, such as the international code of 
pesticides, which became internationally binding as a result of a progressive series of 
consultations over the years. The same applies to the WTO, which is today a stronger 
institution than the GATT of fifty years ago as the product of a continued effort in 
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41 Other testimonies of the practical movement 
towards the solidarist soft-law commitments are the just mentioned AGOA and EBA 
plans, though given their recent introduction, it is still too early to determine their 
impact. Specifically on the international trade-poverty-hunger link, concerns about 
agriculture have escalated in the rank of ministerial priorities over the last few years. 
Discontent about the process of agricultural liberalisation played a strong role in the 
collapse of the 1999 WTO Seattle meeting. As a consequence, a round of negotiations 
on agriculture was launched with the promise of delivering changes in the international 
trade system. The relevance of these normative steps is corroborated by the feelings of 
anxiety that have started to grow in both Brussels and Washington with regard to the 
fifth WTO ministerial meeting to be held in September. If, in the light of the latest FAO 
statistics, the richest core of countries does not provide substantial progress, different 
voices have warned about the possibility of a second collapse, something that the WTO 
cannot afford again.
42 On the issue of hunger, the immediate test confronting the 
international community arises from the latest figures. We cannot predict how this will 
be handled, but we can observe that the normative achievements on the right to food 
remain a potentially valuable foundation for a viable project of solidarism that 
international society has not seen on any other human rights front. The test of Vincent’s 
proposition about basic rights is not yet complete, but there are precedents to suggest 
that over a longer period of time normative consensus can underpin a move from 
pluralist to solidarist practice.   
  This discussion leads to three observations about Vincent’s contributions to 
English school thinking. The first, and most straightforward, is that there is more to the 
human rights agenda of the solidarists than the extreme and exceptional cases of citizens 
either oppressed by their state or finding themselves living in chaos without a 
functioning government. Those cases raise the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention. 
Vincent points to a different agenda triggered by routine practices and requiring not so 
much intervention as structural reform of the global economy. These agendas overlap 
where hunger is generated by famine or war, but they are fundamentally different, and 
the whole ‘resident emergency’ side of human rights has been relatively neglected in the 
solidarist literature that followed Vincent. 
  The second, and still most controversial, is that Vincent’s basic rights approach is 
a valuable, and also mostly neglected, pathway into the English School’s human rights 
agenda. We have argued that Vincent’s idea of building cross cultural normative 
consensus on the least controversial elements of the human rights agenda is worth taking 
more seriously than it has been. It contrasts sharply with the ‘hardest case first’ approach 
typified by Dunne, Knudsen and Wheeler. The two approaches both contrast and 
complement each other, and need to be considered together in a more balanced solidarist 
debate. We have been able to show empirically that the basic rights approach is capable 
of generating a broad normative consensus. Because the evidence is not yet in, we have 
not been able to demonstrate a conclusive link between this and practical policy, but we 
have established the potentiality for such a link, and with the issue of the right to 
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solidarism. 
  The third observation is that Vincent’s work underlines the urgent need to open 
the English school’s debates about international society to the economic domain. His 
basic rights approach to the problem of hunger, as we have shown, simply cannot be 
pursued without engaging with the core debates of International Political Economy 
about the structure and operation of the world economy. That the English school should 
take on board the economic sector in relation to international society is not contested, as 
evidenced by many favourable references to it in the English school classics. What one 
cannot find is any follow up to these references. This rather glaring omission is often 
pointed out.
43 Wight talks of the Rationalist position in terms of diplomacy and 
commerce.
44 Bull notes trade as one of the four institutions in Wight’s understanding of 
a states-system, and he also mentions it in his discussion of rules about cooperation in 
society.
45 Although Bull is critical of Wight’s disinterest in economics, he nevertheless 
failed to develop this aspect in his own discussions of international society, though his 
later work on justice can be read as raising the question of international political 
economy.
46 This is all the more surprising given that he made a feature of the economic 
sector in his critique of those who wanted to take a Hobbesian interpretation of 
international anarchy. Bull argued that 'trade, symbolic as it is of the existence of 
overlapping through [sic? though?] different interests, is the activity most characteristic 
of international relationships as a whole'.
47 James Mayall came closest to making the 
connection between English school thinking and IPE by beginning to think about 
economic liberalism in international society terms. At one point he even argued for the 
existence of a sense of community in the economic sphere despite difference between 
North and South.
48 Given that he was positioned at the LSE alongside Susan Strange, he 
was well placed to bridge between the English school and IPE. But he seemed to lose 
faith in his earlier interpretation,
49 seeing economic nationalism returning on the back of 
national security concerns, and in his more recent works has largely refocused his 
attention toward nationalism.
50  
  As Buzan has argued, the cost to the English school of failing to make this link 
have been considerable.
51 By narrowing the debate down to human rights, it has 
impoverished the whole understanding of solidarism, and made it seem as if there has 
been much less solidarist development in international society than in fact has been the 
case. This, in turn, has unbalanced the positions between solidarists and pluralists, 
making the pluralist case look stronger than it is, and the solidarist case weaker. In 
addition, neglect of the economic sector has made it much more difficult for the English 
school to explore the relationship between international and world society. If one takes 
the commitment to trade as a key element of international society, as both Bull and 
Wight did, then the massive development of norms, rules and institutions around the 
global economy over the last half century have to count in favour of the solidarist 
position. The fact that the main advocates of pluralism ignore the economic domain 
underlines this. The fact that the advocates of solidarism also ignore it is less easy to 
  16understand, not least because nothing conceptual stands in the way of doing so. The 
attempt by the founding fathers of the English school to find a via media between 
liberalism and realism points almost unavoidably to engagement with the agenda of IPE, 
which is very similarly positioned. Consequently, both the English school and IPE are in 
pursuit of a holistic, methodologically pluralist understanding of international relations 
in which states, transnational actors and individuals are in continuous coexistence and 
interplay. Perhaps, in the end, Vincent’s main contribution to English school thinking 
will be to open the door to this long overdue connection. 
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